Judge Land rejects Request in Rhodes vs. Mac Donald

DEMANDS DR. TAITZ TO EXPLAIN WHY HE SHOULD NOT IMPOSE SANCTIONS

by John Charlton

(Sept. 19, 2009) — Yesterday Judge Clay D. Land, in the U.S. District Court-Middle Division of Georgia, issued his order rejecting the request for Emergency Stay pending a Motion for reconsideration, in Rhodes vs. Mc Donald.

In her filing for the new Emergency stay, Dr. Orly Taitz had rebutted Judge Land’s widely condemned ruling, dismissing the case, by pointing out all the judicial and legal errors it contained.

In Judge Land’s new ruling, he dismisses the new Motion with similar invective and ad hominem‘s as his previous ruling.  He begins his court order thus, quoting Yogi Bera, no less:

 “It was de ja vu all over again.”

In her most recent tirade, Plaintiff’s counsel seeks reconsideration of the Court’s order dismissing this action. (p. 1) 

Whereupon the Judge launches into a tirade against Attorney Taitz and her legal arguments, in an attempt to excuse her charge of his own violation of court rules:

The Court finds that the claims and legal contentions asserted in the present motion are not warranted by existing law and that no reasonable basis exists to conclude that Plaintiff’s arguments would be accepted as an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Simply, put the motion is frivolous. (p. 2)

And demands reasons why he should not sanction her $10,000:

Counsel’s conduct violates Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and sanctions are warranted. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (Doc. 15) is denied, and counsel for Plaintiff is ordered to show cause why the Court should not impose a monetary penalty of $10,000.00 upon Plaintiff’s counsel for her misconduct. Counsel shall file her response to this show cause order within 14 days of today’s order. (p. 2)

Judge Land then gives reasons for threatening with her with sanctions, namely that she filed a new motion, using several “frivolous” arguments:

First, counsel contends that the Court dismissed her Complaint without giving her an opportunity to respond adequately as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court’s Local Rules. Counsel ignores that she sought to have the case heard in an expedited fashion in the first place because of Plaintiff’s imminent deployment. (p. 3)

Land contends that he has not violated court rules, because his ruling regarded the Court’s finding that it did not have jurisdiction, rather than the Defense’s Motion to Dismiss, for which Taitz requested time to respond: 

As thoroughly explained in the Court’s order of dismissal, the Court found that under well established legal precedent related to abstention principles, it did not have authority to interfere with the United States Army’s deployment order. Therefore, the Court determined that the case must be dismissed in its entirety. The Court did not grant the Defendant’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), although the Court did note that any such motion if considered would be granted based upon the implausibility of Plaintiff’s claims. If counsel had carefully read the Court’s order, she would have understood that the Court dismissed the Complaint based upon abstention principles.

However, Judge Land seems to forget that in his ruling on Sept. 9th, he explicitly refered to the Motion to Dismiss, and thus did consider it in his judgement, even if he did not formally grant it:

Defendants do argue, however, that the dispute presented by Plaintiff’s complaint is not justiciable in the courts. (p. 6)

Nevertheless, Judge Land concludes his first “frivolous” charge thus:

Counsel’s contention that the Court denied Plaintiff her due process rights under the 5th Amendment to the Constitution by dismissing her Complaint on abstention grounds without giving her more time to respond is frivolous. Counsel sought expedited review of the motion for temporary restraining order. To consider that motion, the Court had the obligation to satisfy itself that it had legal authority to hear the case. It therefore, at Plaintiff’s counsel’s urging, made an expedited decision on that issue. Now that it did not go her way, counsel has fabricated a specious argument that she needed more time to address the issue. (p. 5).

Judge Clay D. Land then moves on to his second charge of “frivolity”, whereby Taitz claimed that he did not address the substance of the Plaintiff’s claims.  To this Judge Land excuses himself, saying that according to abstention principles, he did not have to, and that not to consider his arguments is “frivolous”:

A motion for reconsideration that does not even address the legal basis for the Court’s previous order is frivolous. (p. 5) 

Third, Land launches into high level invective, to establish another claim of “frivolity”:

Finally, it is clear that Plaintiff’s counsel seeks to continue to use the federal judiciary as a platform to further her political “birther agenda.” She has provided no legal or factual basis for the Court to interfere with deployment orders of the United States Army. She supports her claims with subjective belief, speculation and conjecture, which have never been sufficient to maintain a legal cause of action.

Then, in a notably self-contradictory passage, Land engages in impertinent political rhetoric to accuse Taitz of the same:

She continues to file motions that do not address legal issues but that describe the President as a “prevaricator,” allege that the President’s father was “disloyal and possibly treacherous” to the “British Crown,” accuse the undersigned of treason, and suggest that the United States District Courts in this Circuit are “subservient” to the “illegitimate” “de facto President.”

At this time it is not clear where Judge Land hear these just cited statements, which have nothing to do with the pleadings filed in the case; the citation of which seem to indicate Judge Land’s personal political views and misunderstandings of the filings, which according to court rules, he should have read.

Judge Land then concludes his ruling:

 The Court finds Plaintiff’s Motion for Stay of Deployment (Doc. 15) to be frivolous. Therefore, it is denied. The Court notifies Plaintiff’s counsel, Orly Taitz, that it is contemplating a monetary penalty of $10,000.00 to be imposed upon her, as a sanction for her misconduct. Ms. Taitz shall file her response within fourteen days of today’s order showing why this sanction should not be imposed.

Judge Land did not include a response to several points raised in Attorney Taitz’s request for an Emergency Stay pending a Motion to Reconsider:

1) His acceptance of some evidence contrary  to court Rules (e.g. the Hawaiian COLB), and his rejection of the same kind of evidence contrary to court rules which require him to accept Plaintiff’s statement of the facts as true for the time being.

2) Taitz argument regarding Obama evidently not being a Natural Born Citizenship, on the grounds that he has publically admitted a foreign father.

Finally, it seems to even a casual observer, that Judge Clay D. Land has engaged himself personally in the case, and has no more solid charge against Taitz than “frivolity”, even though Rhodes’ case regards the crime of usurpation, which is not a frivolous matter. 

Indeed, in the context of usurpation of the Presidency, Judge Land argues the Courts cannot intervene in military discipline, citing cases which regard issues of much lesser import than usurpation of that or any office in the chain of command.  And this seems to be the principal defect of his argumentation in his ruling last week and in this recent order.