“A SERIOUS AND CREDIBLE INDIVIDUAL”
by David F. LaRocque
(Sept. 5, 2010) — The story that Lucas Smith tells has not changed in the slightest since he first appeared on the national scene in 2009.
I met Lucas Smith at the September 8, 2009 hearing in the case Barnett et al v. Obama. I found Lucas Smith to be a serious and credible individual, as did others who met him at the hearing (the second of three hearings in the Barnett case prior to its dismissal by Judge David O. Carter despite prior assurances by the judge that the case would be heard on its merits.)
See “The Strange Case of Judge David O. Carter” here.
Lucas Smith was prepared to testify at the Sept 8 hearing. When Obama’s Justice Department attorneys objected strongly to any testimony from Mr. Smith, Attorney Taitz suggested that he be given an opportunity to provide a deposition concerning the Kenyan birth certificate. Judge Carter indicated strong interest in this alternative, stating:
…why cannot that deposition (of Lucas Smith) take place while this witness is here? In other words, this witness is present. That deposition could take place. It’s not interfering with the jurisdictional issues that you have because it’s not ‘discovery’ that she is seeking from you. It’s some witness that she has that she believes she can’t get back in a timely fashion.
Hold on. I know you’re opposed to it. I can read your mind.
My question is, why not? First of all, it gives the government a wonderful glimpse of what is forthcoming. It lets you prepare.
Number two, it allows you to put on this witness who’s come all the way from Kenya, whether they’re in danger or not.
Number three, if people need to get this particular witness back, as you claim, that he or she is essential to your claim, then the government can bring them back.
So from the government’s perspective, what are you doing this week? Where are you from?
…Now the problem is, though, if this witness is languishing out in the hallway and you believe that the witness is critical, that person has to continue to languish.
…And my initial question was, to the government, what harm? In other words, they (the defendants) actually got a glimpse of what your claim is…so why wouldn’t we take this witness with the admonition that this witness would have to be called back.
In other words, I’m really concerned about people testifying who are available…
And the response from Obama’s attorneys: “…I think it is an unwise move at this point in time to order this witness be deposed.”
In other words, we (Obama and his attorneys) do not want to hear what Lucas Smith has to say, either in live testimony or in a written deposition, and we certainly do not want the purported Kenyan birth certificate to be made a matter of record and to be subjected to professional analysis by the court.
Judger Carter responded: “I’m just a little perplexed why that wouldn’t be to your benefit, because in case your motion (to dismiss) fails, you know exactly what is coming and you have a chance to either prove it or disprove it, but I leave that to your wisdom.”
The transcript of the September 8 hearing, p. 38, is here.
We can presume that at that point Obama’s attorneys were in a state of panic. They well-knew that they could not disprove the Kenyan birth certificate or discredit any testimony by Lucas Smith. Their best course of action was to get the September 8 hearing over with as quickly as possible, keep Lucas Smith away from the court, and insure that the case would be dismissed. For without a dismissal, they were in deep trouble.
We can only infer from what happened next how Obama’s attorney’s solved the problem of insuring a dismissal of the Barnett case. The following is excerpted from “The Strange Case of Judge David O. Carter”:
When the hearing ended, the plaintiffs and their attorneys felt confident that there would be no dismissal of this case on the technicality of “standing” (as had occurred in several other prominent eligibility cases), and that it would finally be heard on its merits by Judge Carter. Further, the plaintiffs felt that those merits would be very strong, probably even conclusive, once the fruits of the discovery phase of the trial became available.
Then, in early October, word came out that something very strange had happened. Judge Carter had hired a new law clerk, but not just any law clerk.
Judge Carter could have hired a law clerk from among the recent graduates of any one of a number of fine law schools (including his alma mater, the UCLA School of Law) or from any one of hundreds of elite law firms in California and across the country. Instead he hired Siddharth Velamoor, from the Seattle law firm of Perkins Coie, the firm which represented the presidential campaign of Barack Obama and the firm where Obama’s White House Counsel Robert Bauer was formerly a partner. Bauer is married to Anita Dunn, former White House Director of Communications, who is infamous for her publicly-expressed deep admiration for the political philosophy of Mao Zedong, the greatest mass murderer in the history of mankind according to author and former Red Guard Jung Chang in her masterpiece biography of Mao entitled “Mao: The Unknown Story.”
To say that the Barnett plaintiffs were stunned on hearing this news is putting it mildly. This astonishing new development was not only unbelievable; it was incomprehensible. How could this happen in America? On the face of it, this surprising action by Judge Carter was so far outside the norms of appropriate judicial conduct that it seemed unimaginable. It even gave off an odor of corruption and manipulation of the judiciary that was so out of character with what we knew of Judge Carter that one had to wonder – what was the nature of the pressure that was brought to bear on Judge Carter that he would even entertain such a course of action?
To the Barnett plaintiffs and their attorneys, it seemed that Barack Obama had literally stepped into Judge Carter’s court room and sneered at us, telling us literally that ‘I have so much power that you cannot touch me! I am untouchable and I will do as I please.’
A third hearing was held on October 5, 2009 at the federal courthouse in Santa Ana, CA, again with Judge Carter presiding …
Once the hearing commenced, a change in tone became immediately apparent. It seemed that Judge Carter was much more skeptical of the plaintiff’s case, and noticeably more adversarial in his exchanges with Attorney Taitz. In an affidavit regarding this hearing which I provided in connection with the August 11 appeal, I stated that “I thought (the) change in Judge Carter’s demeanor from one hearing to the (October 5) hearing…was striking and quite surprising.” Another affiant made a similar statement in her affidavit: “After the hearing a large group of people met outside and declared that we couldn’t believe the change in the judge’s demeanor. One of the gentlemen, who said that he had known Judge Carter for a long time, stated that he had never seen him like that before.”
On October 29, 2009, Judge Carter released an order dismissing the Barnett case based on lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that “(the) Constitution puts limits on the reach of the federal courts. One of those limits is that the Constitution defines processes through which the President can be removed from office. The Constitution does not include a role for the court in that process.”
So I ask you – do the courts not have jurisdiction when the evidence shows that the person holding the highest office in the land misrepresented his eligibility to serve in that office through conspiracy, fraud and forgery at a minimum?
Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison, stated that the laws must furnish a remedy for a violation of a vested legal right of the people if the government is to continue to deserve the “high appellation” of a “government of laws and not of men.”
I suggest that the time has come for the judicial branch of this government to exercise its proper role and take such action as may be necessary to insure that the Kenyan birth certificate in the possession of Lucas Smith be subjected to forensic examination, and to take such action as may be required upon receiving the report of the results of such examination.