Purpura v. Sebelius, The Last Chance for a Republic

IS IT TIME TO ARREST THE JUDGES?

by Jedi Pauly, ©2011

Taxation without representation was one of the reasons for the American Revolution of 1776

(Aug. 13, 2011) — On Monday, August 8, 2011, the Third Circuit En Banc Court of Appeals upheld Judge Greenaway’s refusal to recuse himself in the Purpura v. Sebelius case which has been seeking to have the Obamacare bill/law struck down as unconstitutional, in part because Obama is not a natural born Citizen and is therefore unauthorized to create any laws with his signature.  The plaintiff Purpura filed a Motion to Recuse since two judges on that Circuit are Obama appointees, and one of them, Judge Greenaway, is one of the three judges in charge who are deciding the case on appeal.  Judge Greenaway is in a direct financial conflict of interest in this case because his job and income depend on ruling against the plaintiffs, as the case will establish that Obama is not a natural born Citizen and therefore, Judge Greenaway’s appointment as a judge is in jeopardy.

Furthermore, if Judge Greenaway had recused himself, then that would have been an admission by the Court that Count 6 (page 5) of the petition before the Court was being admitted to, since that is the Count that establishes that Obama is not a natural born Citizen, which was already established as a matter of record, by default, in the Third Circuit lower court.  By Judge Greenaway refusing to recuse himself, and by the en banc Court upholding that refusal, the entire Court has indicted itself in a cover-up and is refusing to recognize the facts that have already been established in the lower court.  They are declaring that they are not going to follow any due process of law or conduct themselves in a fair and impartial manner.

The Appeals Court’s attitude seems to be that we either all hang together, or we will all hang separately.  The lower court essentially ignored the implications and ramifications of Count 6 that declares Obama to not be a natural born Citizen which implies that as a taxpayer, the plaintiffs are particularly injured as a subset class of natural born Citizen taxpayers by any demand put upon them for their labor (taxes) to pay for Obamacare, regardless of whether or not the bill actually applies to the plaintiffs.  The Appeals Court also seems to be ignoring these implications and ramifications of Obama’s not being a natural born Citizen, and the injury that causes to the political rights of the petitioners.

The lower Court ignored this obvious implication and fabricated a technicality, stating that the plaintiffs, Purpura and Laster, failed to convince the Court with any evidence that the Obamacare bill/law will apply to them, as if that is the necessary element for anything amounting to an injury.  By the Court’s reasoning, since the Obamacare bill/law is not shown to apply to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs have failed to show any injury that is concrete and particular to them that is not a general complaint that affects every citizen equally.  This was the reasoning and excuse then used by the Court and the defendants to dismiss this case for lack of standing, and by refusing to recognize the sovereign political status of the petitioners, the dismissal amounts to saying that the king’s subjects have no standing in the king’s courts, and that the court does not have any jurisdiction to hear this case.  Furthermore, one can surmise that the very same reasoning is the justification for the Court’s and defendants’ failure to even address most of the issues raised by Purpura v. Sebelius in their other points in that petition, because if the Obamacare bill/law does not apply to them, then all of the other constitutional issues raised in the other counts are moot, which explains why the Court and defendants failed to respond to many of the counts, including Count 6, and responded with erroneous legal nonsense where they did bother to reply at all to some of the counts.

The bogus manufactured claim of lack of standing due to no cognizable injury being claimed by the plaintiffs is the position being maintained by the defendants, who have just filed their response to the appeal in this case.  Their response is nothing more than a continuance of the charade of the lower Court, which was that since the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that the Obamacare bill/law will apply to them, there is no cognizable injury; yet I have just shown you what the obvious cognizable injury is.  It is taxation without representation, whether or not the Obamacare bill/law applies to a particular person.  If I, as a simple layman, can see this obvious injury to the plaintiffs raised by implication in Count 6 and that this affects their sovereign political status and rights before the Court, how can it be that these supposed learned men of law who are federal judges cannot?  Furthermore, it is only taxation without representation as regards a minority political class of those who did not vote for Obama, who are natural born Citizens themselves, who are also taxpayers; thus overcoming the courts’ and defendants’ arguments that the petition only raises issues that are a general grievance against government affecting all citizens and is not a particular concrete injury to the plaintiffs or to a limited subset of the citizens at large.

Anyone who voted for Obama, or voluntarily accepts the Obamacare bill/law and voluntarily pays their taxes, has no injury to claim due to the fact of Obama not being a natural born Citizen.  By refusing to recognize this obvious reality of law and by failing to take into account the obvious injury of taxation without representation which Count 6 of the petition raises, the court is refusing to recognize the sovereign political status of the petitioners before the Court, which is in itself an injury to the petitioners, and the Court is refusing to recognize just what the injury to the petitioners actually is.  The refusal to take cognition of these obvious points of law, which is the job of judges and attorneys for the defense, and then fabricate a technicality as a legitimate excuse to hide behind to avoid dealing with the serious criminality that is occurring regarding Obama’s and the Congress’s willful unlawful usurpation of authority against the will of the People (Article II natural born Citizen) only fuels the appearance that either these judges are totally incompetent or are engaged in a criminal cover-up using fabricated technicalities of law to hide behind.  Want more evidence?  Examine the en banc decision to uphold Judge Greenaway’s refusal to recuse himself.

When reviewing what the judges who refused to recuse themselves and the en banc Court has done, one must use the light most favorable to the state to interpret their decisions.  In this light, then, it must be assumed that Judge Greenaway and the en banc Court don’t believe that there is any conflict of interest even if Obama is not a natural born Citizen, or they believe that he is a natural born Citizen so that the motion to recuse has no merit.  There is no point in even addressing the issue from the point of view of the Court believing that Obama is a natural born Citizen, because it was already established by default in the lower Court that he is not a natural born Citizen.  Even if the court ignores that default fact from the lower Court, it is simply not plausible to accept that a judge can possibly believe that Obama meets the understanding and definition of what is meant by “natural born” in Article II, since it is common knowledge and publicly admitted by Obama himself that he was born to a foreign non-U.S. citizen father.  That automatically disqualifies Obama from natural born status and from being a legitimate President or from qualifying under Article II.  Every layman knows this.  It is beyond all credibility that what is obvious to an ordinary layman is beyond the comprehension and cognition of a federal appeals court judge.  Therefore, we can assume that the Court’s behavior is based upon its belief that even though Obama is not legitimate, their appointments would still stand (de facto) and therefore there is no conflict of interest.  There is a major problem with this line of reasoning by the Court.

What rule of law can possibly justify this reasoning by the Court?  There is only one answer, and that would be the de facto officer doctrine.  The de facto officer doctrine is a doctrine that relates the concept that even if an officer of the government is found to be occupying his office without proper authority, and is guilty of some defect that makes his exercising of the powers of that office to be unlawful, as long as the defect does not create a substantive injury to the rights of those who are affected by the de facto officer, then the powers exercised by the de facto officer are legitimate.

For example, the de facto officer doctrine, when applied to judges, can be traced to a New York case where a group of judges had not taken the oath of office but were nevertheless acting as judges.  It was determined from this situation did not disqualify them from acting as judges, constitute grounds to remove them from office or to nullify their previous rulings.  This is because no substantive injury to any rights is created just because a judge has failed to take an oath.  However, that is not the same thing as a judge being appointed without lawful authority and confirmed without lawful authority, right from the outset.

Another application of the de facto officer doctrine would be, for example, if a sheriff were elected who was not a qualified candidate to hold the office of sheriff, perhaps because he did not meet the state statutory requirements, and then he proceeds to make arrests, enforce the laws on the books, or appoint deputies and give orders to his deputies, before he can be found out and removed from office.  Are all his actions then unlawful and void?  No.  The litmus test would be:  does his acting as sheriff when he is not qualified to hold that position create any substantive injury to the rights of those who are affected by his action?  In this example, the only people injured would be those who ran in the election against the de facto sheriff, and would have been deprived of their lawful opportunity to the office, or an injury to the State who has a right to see its state laws enforced.  Therefore, an ordinary citizen or deputy would not have any claim to any injury just because the sheriff is a de facto sheriff, but those who ran against him in the election could sue him with a quo warranto, and the state could remove him from office if it is found that he is not occupying the office lawfully.

Another application of the de facto officer doctrine similar to the sheriff example above would be concerning the military and the right of officers of the military to challenge the orders given by Obama, since Obama is occupying the Office of President unlawfully.  It turns out that the same de facto officer doctrine would prevent officers of the military from questioning the validity of the orders issued by a non-nbC President.  This is because the fact that the President is not an nbC creates no substantive loss of any rights, or even any injury, to a military officer who is under Obama’s authority.

Subordinate officers are not authorized to give their consent to orders from superior officers, unless those orders command the subordinate to commit a crime or contradict a superior officer’s orders.  Following the orders of a de-facto President does not constitute a criminal offense, as the military does not have the authority to challenge and remove a non-nbC President, and no injury to a subordinate officer is created by orders issued by Obama, even though he is not an nbC and is occupying the Office of President without lawful authority.  He is still the Acting President, and that is all that matters for those who are in the military.

When the military person takes off his military hat and puts on his civilian hat, then that is another issue altogether, because the entire point of the Article II nbC clause is not to protect the military, rather, to protect the sovereign political rights of the People in order that the government obtain the consent of the People for creating laws and appointments.  The military superiors do not need the consent of their subordinates, and those who enter into the military contract have waived their sovereign political rights and rights of consent and agreed to servitude as long as they are within the military chain of command.

Returning, then, to the issue of what the Third Circuit en banc Court has done regarding its refusal to recuse Judge Greenaway:  the de-facto officer doctrine does not apply in this case, because Judge Greenaway’s appointment is an injury to the sovereign political rights of the People from the outset of his appointment and confirmation since no lawful consent has been obtained from the natural born Citizens for such appointment.  His exercise of his powers as a judge is a continuing and ongoing injury and insult to the sovereign political rights of the citizenry, especially to any natural born Citizen petitioner who is before Judge Greenaway.  It is a particularly egregious injury when the issue before the judge deals specifically with an injury that has occurred and is occurring due to the President exercising unlawful authority which creates the very injury of taxation without representation which is declared in the petition by implication in Count 6, which declares that the Office of President is not being occupied by a natural born Citizen.  That is the entire reason the natural born Citizen petitioners had an injury that brought them to the Court in the first place.  To then say that a judge who is appointed without lawful authority, and confirmed without lawful authority by Congress, is not in a conflict of interest to hear a case where the injury arises from the very same source of unlawful authority, is obviously a gross violation of the Petitioners’ Constitutionally-protected due process rights and rights of sovereign political status before the court.  This shows us, then, that not only is Judge Greenaway in a direct financial conflict of interest, but he is also in a legal conflict of interest because his adjudication of this petition creates substantive legal right injuries to the petitioners’ rights of due process and sovereign political status as natural born Citizens before the Court.

In this light, then, it can be interpreted that the Third Circuit en banc Appeals Court is seeking political protection from a higher court and has actually given a new opportunity of appeal to the petitioners, Nicholas Purpura, Donald Laster, Jr., and also to natural born sovereign Citizens throughout the country.  It would seem that the Court has decided that the issue before it is beyond its station and so is ripe for the United States Supreme Court, since this refusal to recuse under these unique circumstances in history creates a unique injury case in legal history that has never occurred.  The Court has unanimously sent a message to the United States Supreme Court that there is a unique and important legal issue of first impression that the Court must address, and the issue is obviously a constitutional one.

Here is the question that the Court has now raised for the Supreme Court with its error:  Can the government appoint judges and can Congress approve those judges when the appointments are made by a President who lacks the Constitutional qualification to hold the Office of President since he is not a natural born Citizen as required by Article II, Section 1, clause 5, which is meant to protect the sovereign relationship and status of the People before the government?  Furthermore, can that judge, thus appointed and confirmed without lawful Constitutional authority, then rule on a case before him when the very injury being claimed by the petitioners arises from the same source of unlawful authority which appointed and confirmed that judge, and is this not an obvious conflict of interest?  The appointment of a judge without constitutional authority is an unconstitutional act.  Since the Supreme Court has previously ruled that an unconstitutional act conveys no lawful authority for an office, appointment, or law, it would seem to be a no-brainer that there is a conflict of interest here, and the Court will have to overturn the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ actions and side with Purpura.  That is, of course, if the Petitioners properly raise this issue on appeal as outlined here, and the Supreme Court grants certiorari.

There has not been a legal case or issue this important since the founding of our Republic almost 250 years ago.  If the Supreme Court has any integrity left at all and is not totally corrupt and involved in a cover-up of the crimes being committed by Obama and the Congress, then they will have no choice but to grant certiorari and undo this terrible precedent set by the lower courts that is an insult and robbery of the sovereignty of the People.  If they fail to take this case and reverse this Appeals Court’s decision, then the U.S. Supreme Court will indict themselves as co-conspirators and create the appearance that the sovereignty of the People of the United States of America is a joke and is no longer recognized by the government.  They will set and establish the precedent that the government is the master and the People are the slaves, and they will overturn hundreds of years of stare decisis that says the people are the ultimate sovereign authority and the government serves the people, not the other way around.  Furthermore, they will encourage further conflicts of interest and bad behavior within the federal judiciary and shut the door to future petitions regarding Obama’s illegitimacy and the injury that causes to the rights of the sovereign People.  If the Supreme Court does not take this case and reverse it, the Justices will go down in history as the most evil and corrupt justices in the history of mankind, responsible for enslaving a Nation.  One would hardly think that they would want to be stuck with being labeled with that distinction.