ARGUMENTS HISTORIC IN DEFENSE OF RIGHTS OF “WE THE PEOPLE”
by John Charlton
(Sept. 21, 2009) — Late this afternoon, Dr. Orly Taitz, lead counsel in Barnett et al. vs. Obama et al. filed her response to the Defense’s Motion to Dismiss, which will be heard by Judge David O. Carter, in court, on October 5th.
Attorney’s Taitz response was filed in the form of a Preliminary Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, reserving her clients’ rights to file again, on this issue, prior to the Oct 5th hearing. Several previous reports about this case have been published by The Post & Email.
Taitz begins her rebuttal thus:
Fundamentally, this case comes down to a single bifurcated question: (1A) does the constitution mean what it says when it lays down absolute parameters, such as the age and citizenship qualifications to be President, and (1B) to whom does the investigation and enforcement of this constitutional provision [pertain]: to the Congress, the People, or can the President get by merely asserting his qualifications without presenting evidence which would be competent as Summary Judgment (admissible) evidence under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?
Attorney Taitz then states the reason for her plaintiffs action, as it pertains to this matter:
The Plaintiffs have brought their complaint as a matter of first impression to ask this Court to determine, find, hold, and rule that the investigation and enforcement of this right belongs to the people, even members of a discrete an insular minority of the people, even if this group lacks majoritatiran political power. Plaintiffs respond to the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and ask this Court to rule, pursuant to the First and Ninth Amendments that they may sue to enforce constitutional absolutes, such as the constitutional requirements for President of the United States. Plaintiffs assert an inalienable, reserved right to sue for Constitutional conformity in this case even though the concede that the Defendents have shown that primary, first line actions could and should have been taken by members of Congress or the Electoral College, pursuant to the Twelfth and Twentieth Amendments for instance.
And then explains the essence of the Defense’s argument:
Defendants in effect ask this Court to conclude, find, hold, and rule that “willful disregard of the letter of the law is proof of compliance with that law.” Plaintiffs submit and content, by contrast, that Congress’ neglect and derogation of its duty to take investigative or prosecutorial action does not render any unchallenged action legitimate. Surely in a free society, the sovereign people have more and better rights.
Nor is Congressional inaction sufficient to nullify and obliterate the rights of the people to Petition the Federal Courts for Redress of one or more very specific constitutional violations, or for that matter to petition a court to declare and adjudge that the electoral process has been perverted by fraud. The rule in a free society must be the contrary: whenever authority or eligibility are questioned, Congress, and in default of Congressional action, the people, may and should presume the absence of authority and eligibility. The Federal Judicial Courts are the final recourse of the people, and the access of the people to the Courts to challenge the unconstitutional excercise of authority is guaranteed by the First and Ninth Amendments.
Taitz then attacks the quo warrento statute head on, claiming this right exists for all citizens, regardless of the Congressional restriction to the Federal District Court in Washington D. C.:
Plaintiffs content that quo warranto remains a right under the Ninth Amendment as this clause of the Bill of Rights was understood and presumed by the Founders. It is the promise of the reservation of the right to bring the sovereign prerogative writ of quo warrento, which affords the only judicial (and indeed, only politically realistic) remedy for violations of the Constitution by public officials and agents. It was to give the Courts the independence to judge and punish constitutional violations and derogation without fear of political reprisal that the Founders gave life tenure to Article III Judges.
Plaintiffs accordingly demand that this Court breath life into quo warrento and all the other royal prerogative writs preserved in the Ninth Amendment which must be combined with a general reinvigorating standing for private prosecution of public rights, subverted by the decision in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923)…
Attorney Taitz then cites the abusive treatment received by the plaintiffs in Hollister vs. Soetero to show that the D.C. quo warrento statute is not being properly applied. Taitz’s filing continues its grand and patriotic advocacy, speaking against Obama’s secreting away of his personal records:
The question is not one of precedent, the question is whether politics dictate the outcome in many or most Obama-related cases, where avoiding discovery and fact-finding is the primary (and outcome-determinative) goal. Plaintiffs submits that if discovery is ever allowed in this case, it will be rapidly settled by the resignation or impeachment of the President. If the stone wall of secrecy and suppression is every removed, if California sunshine is every allowed to shine for one day on the real evidence, the Presidency of Barack Hussein Obama will be rapidly brought to a rather embarrassing close, and the Defendants’ counsel know it, just as Judges Land and Lazzara know it in Georgia and Florida. Secrecy and refusal to divulge information can have only one possible purpose: to hide an inconvenient truth. Everywhere the Plaintiffs or their counsel have gone, they have been met with resistance, which can only be described as irrational, if there were nothing to hide.
Attorney Tatiz then eloquently summarized the standing her military plaintiffs have in the case, regarding the injury they suffer with an ineligible Commander-in-Chief. And joins in with the brief filed by Attorney Kreep, in arguing that “where no Constitutional remedy exists for an outrageous and egregious constitutional violation, the Courts ought to infer one, as they did in the application of the standards of a civil action under 43 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 to Federal Law Enforcement officers in the case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 504 U.S. 388 (1971).
Next, Taitz rebuts the argument that Federal Courts cannot redress the issue of eligibility. And castigates the Defense to alleging that the Congress and Electoral college can determine what a natural born citizen is, even though they cite no statue or law to this effect.
She concludes thus:
Plaintiffs pray that the Court deny Defendants’ Document #56 Motion to Dismiss in all respects, grant Plaintiffs’ taxpayer standing on analogy to the Establishment Clause standing authorize by the United States Supreme Court in Flast v. Cohen and/or, either in addition or in the alternative, find and hold that the First and Ninth Amendments expressly reserve to the people a generalized right to petition for redress of grievances caused by constitutional violations such as the establishment of religion or the violation of the “natural born citizenship” requirement of Article II.