Taitz files motion seeking Recusal of Judge Land

CITES JUDGE’S NUMEROUS CONFLICTS OF INTEREST & EVIDENT PREJUDICE

by John Charlton

(October 3, 2009) — Dr. Orly Taitz, esq., former counsel for Captain Connie Rhodes in the case Rhodes vs. Mac Donald et al., in the Federal District Court, Middle Division of Georgia, has filed a Motion for Recusal of the federal judge, the Honorable Clay D. Land, on grounds of numerous conflicts of interest.

Attorney Taitz makes the following assertions:

First, there is some circumstantial evidence that Judge Clay D. Land may have had extrajudicial an ex-parte contacts with the Obama administration, in particular from Attorney General Eric Holder (See Affidavit, Exhibit A). Second, a preliminary review of the results of the Honorable Judge Clay D. Land’s public disclosures concerning his investments, it appears that the undersigned Judge Land may be disqualified because he has equity ownership of certain securities (e.g. Microsoft and Comcast) which are aligned both politically and economically with a key Defendant in this case, namely the de facto President of the United States, Barack Hussein Obama, in such a direct and personal way that it could be said that this Judge has a financial stake in the outcome of the former Plaintiff Captain Connie Rhodes’ original case-in-chief.

Attorney Taitz then cites the filings mentioned in The Post & Email’s Spotlight report on Judge Land.

Then Dr. Taitz makes her principal charge:

The primary reason for the undersigned counsel to file this Motion to Recuse, however, is that Judge CLAY D. LAND has by his own actions created a constitutionally intolerable situation in which he is both complaining party, prosecuting attorney, judge and jury regarding the charges of frivolous filing and sanctionalbe conduct which he has leveled sua sponte and filed pursuant to Rule 11(c)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proceedure.

Taitz then cites the inconsistencies in Judge Land’s Sanction notice, which undermine the lawfulness of the same:

The Court’s Order to Show Cause, rendered September 18, 2009, expressly identifies the origin or authority of the court’s intention to sanction the undersigned as Rule II of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but also states in conclusion: “The Court notifies Plaintiff’s counsel, Orly Taitz, that it is contemplating a monetary penalty of $10,000.00 to be imposed upon her, as a sanction for her misconduct”. Page 7 of 9-18-09 Order (Document 19 in the Clerk’s Docket Report for this case on PACER). The text of the order is generally ambiguous and quite confusing as to exactly what Judge Land intends by his order, other that the use of the Court’s inherent “contempt” power in and for the purpose of suppressing the undersigned counsel’s First Amendment Rights.

To begin with, this Court has ordered the undersigned counsel to show cause why a “monetary penalty of $10,000.00” should not be imposed on her.  The word “penalty” suggests that the Court considers th is to be a CONTEMPT proceeding, as does the fact that, on pages 1-2 of the same September 18, 2009, order, the Court writes “This filing CONEMPTUOUSLY ignores the Court’s previous admonition that the Plaintiff’s counsel discontinue her illegitimate use of the federal judiciary to further her political agenda.” (all caps and bold italic highlighting added for emphasis). If the words “penalty” and “contemptuously” be taken at face value, then indeed, the undersigned counsel is entitled to certain protections, including a trial-by-jury.  The United States Supreme Court has held that an accused contemnor is entitled to a full “trial-by-jury.” Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147; S. Ct. 1503; L. Ed. 2d 162 (1969). The Court’s purpose seems plainly punitive, the Court was not prompted by any party’s motion for the sanctions in this case, and in essence, because (as will be seen below) the strictures of Rule 11 do not readily appear to apply to this case, it is probably that the Court is relying here on its own inherent power to punish contempts, and that Plaintiff must be afforded BOTH an impartial and dispassionate magistrate (which could NOT POSSIBLY include the complainant, Judge Clay D. Land) and a trial-by-jury because of the “penalty” amount of $10,000.00.

Attorney Taitz then faults Land’s reading of Rule 11, and claims he is giving it a novel interpretation, namely to sanction political speech.  She then cites case law to establish a right to a trial-by-jury when a penalty that large is threatened.  She also further asks how the Court knows of the “birther agenda”, to mention it in both rulings and sanction orders, and concludes:

The undersigned counsel submits that this Judge has, among other things, radically PREJUDGED the case which the former Plaintiff Captain Connie Rhodes brought, when he finds that there is “no legal or factual basis” for her contentions, as when he states that “she supports her claims with subjective belief, speculation, and conjecture . . .”

What exactly does the Court find so very speculative or subjective about private investigator’s reports, expert opinions, colored and/or certified copies of Kenyan birth records admissible under the “ancient documents” doctrine of the Federal Rules of Evidence?

She then rebuts the charge that the Plaintiff’s claims were frivolous, which was the repetitious claim of Land in his ruling against Rhodes:

Could these questions potentially render the results of the 2008 election void on constitutional grounds? Yes. Could such a result have dramatic political consequences? Yes. Is it a frivolous case, merely because it has such potential political consequences? Not when compared with Bush v. Gore (2000), Jones v. Clinton (1996), or United States v. Nixon (1974), which were all based on substantially less obvious constitutional questions or violations, which were also much more difficult both to detect, determine with certainty, and ultimately to prove, than the Constitutional issues brought in this case.

Attorney Taitz then gives a historical summary of the school-desegregation proceedings in the 40’s and 50’s, and cites their complexity, and the Court’s approval in hearing cases on this question. And she argues that rejection of pleadings merely on the basis of political consequence would result in a great number of regularly-heard-cases being rejected in contradiction to established jurisprudence of the Federal Courts.

Then, she cites the tenor and swiftness of Land’s decisions as evidence that he was impartial in issuing them. And concludes that the “birther” charge must be derived from extrajudicial communications, since she never claimed such a status.

Next, she cites numerous reasons in Judge Land’s rulings that establish her charge of impartiality:  lack of citation of Plaintiff’s arguments as showing that the Judge did not give them their due hearing; his ignoring of the broader claims of the Plaintiff,  and summarizes the reason for the request for recusal:

Whether Judge LAND acted prejudicially upon orders or coercion from other branches of government of if Judge LAND is acting solely and exclusively out of blind personal prejudice against the questions presented by Plaintiff’s Application and Complaint, Judge LAND is disqualified to serve as judge and must either recuse himself or be recused.

In the rest of her filing, Dr. Taitz addresses the details of the law and case precedents to bolster her argument on the basis of her 5th and 9th Amendment rights.  In her summary conclusion, she remarks:

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §144, no further action in this case may be taken without further decision by the Chief Judge of the Middle District of Georgia with regard to the appointment of an independent judicial review of Judge CLAY D. LAND’s management and the character of his disposition of issues in this case.

In Exhibit A the Visit of Eric Holder to Columbus Georgia is cited, as circumstantial evidence that he spoke with Land.

Dr. Taitz has accordingly filed a second Motion requesting an extension til Oct 16th to respond to Judge Land’s request to show cause why he should not sanction her.